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Workplace safety is a topical issue in public policy debates in industri-
alizing countries like Cambodia where high economic growth rates have
yet to translate into higher job quality. This paper studies the relationship
between informal employment and occupational health using the 2012
Cambodia Labour Force Survey. I estimate probit models and find that
informal employment on its own is associated with a significant increase
in the probability of work injury/illness. However in the most complete
specification with controls for personal, job and firm characteristics, the
effect of informal employment turns out to be small in magnitide and
statistically insignificant. I discuss possible explanations for this finding.
Results from this analysis suggest that in a context of weak administrative
capacity for the enforcement of labour regulations, as is the case in Cam-
bodia, work health risks are a concern across the board, not just in the
informal sector.
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1 Introduction
Work is a key aspect of people’s lives. This is reflected in the 2013 World
Development Report which depicts jobs as ‘the cornerstone of economic and
social development’ (World Bank, 2012, p. 2). By raising living standards and
productivity and strengthening social cohesion, the social returns to certain jobs
may even exceed the individual returns. But some jobs may not be as beneficial.
This includes jobs that expose workers to injury and/or illness thus diminishing
their health human capital. In this regard, there is evidence that work injuries
are the cause of a significant number of deaths globally. However, as reported
by Wu, Schwebel, and Hu (2018), Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs)
accounted for over 92% of unintentional occupational injury mortality in 2016.
The higher occupational health risk in LMICs may be ascribed at least partly
to their employment structure and general economic structure. A major charac-
teristic of developing countries (DCs) is the large proportion of workers who are
engaged in informal employment (ILO, 2018). Informal employment performs
a crucial distributional function, providing a means of livlihood for many in a
context of low social protection coverage which rules out unemployment as an
option for most people. However, the general picture of informal employment
points to increased health risks for informal workers. This stems from the fact
that informal employment takes place outside of the purview of government
regulation and control (Forastieri, 1999). But also important is the small nature
and short-term focus of the typical informal enterprise such that competitive
pressures and financial constraints obviate meaningful investments in workplace
safety (Cohn & Wardlaw, 2016). Against the foregoing background, I estimate
probit models using data from the 2012 Cambodia Labour Force Survey and
find that informal employment is associated with up to a 4.29-percentage point
increase in the probability suffering a work injury/illness. However, in the most
complete specification of the probit model controlling for a set of individual,
job and firm characteristics, the size of the effect of informal employment drops
and loses its significance.
This paper is related to the analysis of ‘health shocks’ and its role in the
dynamics of poverty which has in recent years received significant attention in
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development theory and policy (Alam & Mahal, 2014). Sudden health problems
may lower earned income due to reduced work-days or the complete inability
to work. This, combined with the attendant increase in out-of-pocket health
expenditures, can push households into poverty which they might find difficult
to escape from. In a context where labour is the chief source of income for
most people, it is therefore important to look into employment conditions as
a source of health shocks. Establishing whether certain forms of employment
harm workers’ health will also help policy makers to prioritize those sections
of the working population most susceptible to occupational hazards (Fletcher,
Sindelar, & Yamaguchi, 2011).
A vast empirical literature in economics considers whether there is an earn-
ings differential between formal and informal employment with mixed evidence
(Gindling, Mossaad, & Newhouse, 2016). However, in this paper, I consider
whether there is an occupational injury/illness differential between informal
and formal employees using data from Cambodia, an industrializing developing
country. Cambodia is an interesting and relevant context to study the health
implications of informal employment due to the socioeconomic transformation
taking place in the country which arguably have implications for workers’ health.
Over the past two decades, industrialization in Cambodia has gathered pace
particularly with the rise of the garment industry which boosted per capita
income growth1 and welfare especially for poorer households (Mejia-Mantilla &
Woldemichae, 2017). While trade agreements that linked access to the United
States market to compliance with international labour standards appear to have
improved working conditions in licensed exporting firms (Neak & Robertson,
2009), concerns remain for workers in informal cottage factories to which
licenced factories routinely sub-contract production (Human Rights Watch,
2015). Moreover, labour standards are known to be less favourable in other
manufacturing activities in Cambodia with higher levels of informality such as
the brick and tile and salt production (Neak & Robertson, 2009). The economic
expansion in Cambodia is also happening in tandem with rapid urbanization
and the attendant increase in construction activity (Sievleang, 2015). Concerns
1From USD 300 in 1994 to about USD 1,070 in 2015 when the country entered the LMIC
group of countries (World Bank, 2017, p. 12).
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have also been raised in the academic literature and popular media in Cambodia
about health and safety standards in the construction sector which is considered
to be one of the most hazardous sectors even in advanced economies (Durdyev,
Mohamed, Lay, & Ismail, 2017; Abdalla, Apramian, Cantley, & Cullen, 2017).
Notwithstanding the emergence of garment manufacturing and construction,
agriculture remains a major source of employment and income in Cambodia
(World Bank, 2017) and with large-scale commercial agricultural projects gain-
ing ground, farmers in Cambodia are also being increasingly exposed to the
health risks that come with agricultural intensification (Speller et al., 2017;
Lam, Pham, & Nguyen-Viet, 2017). High growth rates have also yet to translate
into higher-quality jobs. A large proportion of the workforce in Cambodia
remain engaged in informal employment and most business establishments
are unregistered thus limiting the reach of labour regulations concerning oc-
cupational health and safety and other aspects of working conditions (ADB,
2015). Previous work on aspects of working conditions in Cambodia such
as Oka (2016) has focused on the garments manufacturing sector given its
centrality in the economic life of the country. However the contribution of this
paper is a broader consideration of employment conditions and workers’ health
in all sectors of the economy as contained in the CLFS.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I provide an overview of the
economics of workplace health and safety including the theory compensating
wage differentials. In section 3, I discuss some aspects of informal employment
that may heighten occupational health risk for informal workers. I then describe
the empirical methodology in section 4. In section 5, I describe the data set
and provide descriptive statistics of the study sample. I discuss the results in
section 6 and briefly conclude in section 7.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical Background
The theoretical framework of Dorman (2000), which links occupational health
and safety (OHS) in a firm to its choice of production strategy and personnel,
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is instructive for understanding how informal employment might pose adverse
health effects. Some firms, say type A firms, offer a good of average quality sold
at the cheapest possible price while keeping production costs as low as possible.
They enjoy this low-cost producer status for as long as they can maintain it
and promptly exit the market when it is no longer possible. Other firms, say
type B firms, are more concerned about quality. They aim for a modest market
share to which they sell their higher quality product at a premium and intend
to remain in the industry indefinitely. The difference in market strategies has
implications for personnel policies. Consistent with its strategy of low cost
production, A-type firms offer low wages and make the barest minimum, if any,
investment in workers’ health and morale. B on the other hand, in line with its
own market strategy, pays a wage premium and prioritizes the maintenance of
a safe working environment among other personnel policies. These two cases
given by Dorman (2000) are obviously polar opposites. In reality, firms will
pursue mixed strategies and fit somewhere in the spectrum of firm types in a
given economy. The relevance of Dorman’s model to OHS is that good working
conditions are closely linked to other personnel choices and the extent to which
the firm is B-type. Informal sector firms are arguably closer to type A than type
B.
In the analysis of Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2013), the level of OHS in
an economy is the outcome of the incentives faced by workers and firms in
labour and insurance markets as well as government regulation. In a perfectly
competitive setting, workers are assumed to be rational and would therefore
demand a wage premium as compensation for health and safety risks. Their
regard for safety on the job and how long they stay out of work once ill or
injured is also affected by whether or not they are covered by social insurance
and compensation benefit schemes. Firms on the other hand choose a level of
safety considering the marginal costs of investing in health and safety measures
and its benefits which include a lower wage bill due to the lower risk of injuries
and illnesses, reduced disruptions in production due to absent workers among
other benefits pointed out by Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2013).
The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWD) is a central aspect
of the economic analysis of workplace health and safety. The theory predicts
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a positive association between wages and the risk of injury or death on the
job, or any other unpleasant job characteristic for that matter,2 ceteris paribus.
This tradeoff between risk and money has formed the basis for estimating the
value of a statistical life (VSL) or the willingness to pay (WTP) for safety in
several countries across the world (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003). The CWD theory
assumes a perfectly competitive labour market with no information asymmetries
regarding job risks as well perfect mobility such that workers have a range
of jobs to choose from.3 Guo and Hammitt (2009) however argue that the
standard CWD theory does not consider how the compensation for risk depends
on the level of unemployment (or underemployment) which limits a worker’s
options. Workers may choose to remain in high-risk jobs when alternative
employment is not available thus negating the assumption of perfect worker
mobility.
Some studies have also considered the validity of the CWD theory in the
context of a segmented labour market which is a more realistic characterization
of labour markets in countries like Cambodia. Segmented models typically
make a formal/informal (or primary/secondary) distinction with different
wage determination mechanisms and employment policies and limited mobility
between the segments (Fields, 2009; Dickens & Lang, 1992). Formal wage
employment pays higher wages and offers better working conditions which
contradicts the main prediction of the CD theory of an inverse relationship
between wages and (good) working conditions. The key point here is that in a
segmented market, the degree to which a worker is able to choose between jobs
and trade off job disamenities depends on which strata of the labour market
the worker is positioned.
2According to Adam Smith who originated the concept: “the wages of labour vary with
the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness
of the employment” (Adam Smith 1776, p.112 as cited in Viscusi & Aldy, 2003, p.7). Some
scholars have thus criticized the focus on job safety in the analysis of compensating differentials.
Construction workers and call centre operators for example would not attach the same level of
importance to job safety (Daw & Hardie, 2012).




The foregoing discussion of the economic theory of occupational health and
safety considered whether the market compensates workers for performing risky
jobs. But the insights also help to understand occupational injury differentials.
In a segmented labour market, a key empirical question is how differences in
employment or working conditions across sectors relate to health outcomes
such as the relative prevalence or probability of occupational injury. The level
of workplace safety is jointly determined by the actions of workers, firms and
government. The government, on its part, performs its crucial regulatory role
through a system of inspections and penalties imposed on establishments for
contravening health and safety regulations (Wei, Russell, & Sandy, 2005). The
informal economy however, by definition, operates outside the purview of
regulatory authorities. Thus it is likely the case that working conditions, the
quality of which depends significantly on the enforcement of health and safety
laws, are relatively riskier in the informal sector. Formal and informal firms
face common health and safety issues, but informal firms are less capable of
addressing these issues. Frick and Walters (1998) attribute the poor health and
safety record of small and medium-sized enterprises, most of which in Cambodia
are informal/unregistered (Tanaka & Keola, 2017), to factors including, inter
alia, undervaluation of the economic benefits of health and safety, limited
management resources and short-term economic pressure. But formal sector
employment may not necessarily shield a worker from occupational hazards
particularly in the context of weak administrative or institutional capacity for
the enforcement of labour regulations. As Almeida and Ronconi (2016) point
out, enforcement is crucial to create the urgent incentive for establishments to
comply with regulations.4
Macro-level analyses have established a positive relationship between a
country’s share of informal employment in total employment and health in-
dicators such as ‘years of life lost’ and ‘disability-adjusted life years’ (DALYs)
4For further evidence on the effect of government enforcement on compliance with a range
of labour regulations see for example Ronconi (2010) for Argentina and Almeida and Carneiro
(2012) which considers the effects of stricter enforcement on the level of formal and informal
sector employment and wages in Brazil.
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(Muntaner et al., 2010). There is also a descriptive literature in disciplines
including occupational medicine and sociology that examines the relationship
between employment conditions and health outcomes at the micro level. But
as these studies are mostly occupation or workplace specific, their conclusions
are to be interpreted in context. Multivariate studies include Alfers and Rogan
(2015) who find using data from South Africa that the effect of formality in
employment on self-reported general health status becomes insignificant after
controlling for a range of factors including income. A similar finding is reported
by Santana and Loomis (2004) for Brazil thus suggesting the presence of health
and safety concerns across the employment spectrum and not just in informal
work. However in an experimental study conducted in Ethiopia which randomly
placed workers into low-skill industrial wage jobs, a control group, and an en-
trepreneurship program, Blattman and Dercon (2016) find that income gains
from industrial wage jobs were little and the health risks substantial compared
to the control group while informal self-employment increased incomes without
significant health costs. In their experiment, many participants placed in factory
wage jobs quit after a few months.
A closely related empirical literature looks at the health effects of atypical
employment more generally5, such as fixed-term or temporary contracts, part-
time work, on-call work or ‘zero-hour contracts’ and the like. Most of the
literature on atypical employment focuses on advanced economies where an
increased emphasis on labour market flexibility in response to economic crises or
as a means of retaining competitiveness in the global economy (Lang, Schömann,
& Clauwaert, 2013; European Commission, 2007) has raised questions about
its effect on workers’ health and wellbeing. The explanations given in this
literature for the higher risk of work accidents in temporary employment might
very well apply to informal employment in developing countries. Guadalupe
(2003) for example notes that employers have a lower incentive to invest in
firm-specific human capital (which includes detailed health and safety training)
5Atypical employment refers to employment arrangements that differ from the stan-
dard model of full-time or open-ended employment with a single employer over a




for workers on temporary contracts. But if it is the case that low quality workers
are systematically hired on temporary contracts, then the difference in accident
probability compared to workers on permanent contracts might be due to
unobserved difference in worker quality. The empirical analysis of Guadalupe
(2003) addresses this issue and show a ‘pure contractual effect’ of fixed-term
contracts on the probability of work accidents in Spain. Hernanz and Toharia
(2006) provide evidence to the contrary for Spain (using a different dataset)
and Italy with their finding that in both countries the difference in probability
of work accident between fixed-term and permanent workers vanishes when
personal and job characteristics are accounted for. Sanwald and Theurl (2014)
in a meta-analysis of 52 studies covering 26 countries find a higher risk of work
injury in addition to poorer mental and physical health for atypical employees.
3 Potential Risk Factors in Informal Employment
In addition to identifying a link between informal employment and negative
health outcomes, it is also necessary to explore specific factors that could
arguably heighten health and safety risks for informal workers.
The absence of a binding contractual obligation on the part of the employer
for the safety of the worker and the fact that regulatory authorities do not inspect
informal or unregistered firms is a key factor linking informal employment to
health risks. Experimental studies elsewhere show that randomized safety
inspections reduce injury rates (Levine, Toffel, & Johnson, 2012). Operating
outside the radar means that there is no urgency on the part of some employers
to actively maintain safe working environments. Observational studies on
the health implications of informal employment in other developing countries
support this proposition.6 Informal establishments lack the incentive to make
long-term investments with uncertain returns in the face of more immediate
concerns of staying afloat. Enterprise owners and managers may be well aware
of the occupational hazards in their operations but the lack of permanent
workplaces may discourage active investment in health and safety (Rongo,
6See for example Loewenson (1998), Mock, Adjei, Acheampong, DeRoo, and Simpson
(2005) and Akinbami and Momodu (2013).
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Barten, Msamanga, Heederik, & Dolmans, 2004).
Related to the foregoing point is the low level of technology that charac-
terises informal work in, for example, pollution-intensive industrial activities
like artisanal and small-scale mining. The rudimentary technologies for ex-
traction and processing for instance can lead to environmental, health and
safety problems which reduce the quality of life of workers engaged in such
activities (Hilson, 2002; Spiegel, 2016). At the same time, the process of tech-
nology adoption, though essential for learning-by-doing and economic growth
as the experience elsewhere in Asia shows, also brings about new occupational
risks in the workplace especially in the early stages of the use of new tech-
nology. For large informal firms that can afford to acquire foreign technology,
it is not uncommon for them to import outdated or second-hand machinery.
As Savchenko (2012) observes, garment manufacturers in Cambodia utilize
old technology: machines are mostly obtained second-hand after use in more
advanced economies like China and Hong Kong.7 The process of technology
adoption can affect the health and safety of workers if knowledge transfer
focuses only how the machines or processes work with little or nothing on how
they affect the health and working life of the people who use them or if there is
no adaptation of imported machinery to the characteristics of local users (ILO,
1988; Jafry & O’Neill, 2000). The health risk in the use of new production tech-
nology adoption is indeed not peculiar to the informal sector. But large formal
firms such as multinational corporations are more likely to have standardized
technologies in their operations across the world or be under more pressure to
give attention to health and safety issues in technology transfer.
Another factor behind the higher occupational health risk in informal work
is the weak, if any, influence of labour unions in the informal sector thus
limiting the ability of workers to push for the prioritization of health and
safety issues in the workplace. Independent labour unions are a key part of
any effective system of industrial relations that aims to reconcile the objective
of enterprises to remain competitive with workers’ desire for better pay and
working conditions (World Bank, 1995, p. 79). Unions can, at least in theory,
7A similar route was taken by Taiwan and Korea who adopted Japan’s slightly outdated
production techniques as a launch pad for their own industrial development (Brautigam, 1997)
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reduce an employee’s risk of injury by solving the externality problem that
may result in a case where workers individually bargain over safety measures.
Job safety can be regarded as a ‘non-rival public good’ (World Bank, 1995,
p. 80). It will be costly for workers to personally monitor and effect changes
in health and safety procedures. Other workers cannot be excluded from
‘consuming’ any resulting improvement in job safety which an individual worker
is able to bring about with personal financial resources. Unions address this
externality problem by providing information on job hazards, which they can
gather more cheaply, thus enhancing the ability of their members to achieve safe
working environments (Fenn & Ashby, 2004; Donado & Wälde, 2012). However,
organizing informal workers presents distinct challenges. As documented by
Bonner and Spooner (2011), these challenges stem from the heterogeneity of
economic acivities that fall under the informality umbrella as well as competing
interests both within the informal economy and between formal and informal
sector worker groups. According to Ward and Mouyly (2016), in Cambodia,
union membership outside the garment manufacturing sector is as low as 1% of
the total labour force.8 Chhengpor and Retka (2015) point out that only 2.7%
of informal workers in Cambodia are directly or indirectly involved in a labour
union. The increasing use of casual or short-term contracts by employers in
Cambodia further reduces workers’ capacity for collective action to improve
working conditions. As argued by Arnold and Han Shih (2010) the increasing
informalization of labour relations is the biggest barrier to unionization in
Cambodia. Informal workers in Cambodia and elsewhere in the developing
world are nevertheless increasingly organising in different forms detailed by
Eaton, Schurman, and Chan (2017) for representation in relevant policy making
and negotiation processes in the workplace.
The final factor linking informal employment to poor health outcomes is
the piece rate which is a common payment scheme in informal work especially
in activities where it is easy to measure output such as agriculture and factory
production. Labour costs are lower in developing countries relative to advanced
8In an interview granted to Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA, Tola Moueun, a prominent labour
rights activist in Cambodia, estimates union membership at ‘less than 5%’ of the total labour
force compared to over 60% in the garment sector. Interview available at https://www
.apheda.org.au/trade-union-repression-in-cambodia/: Accessed 2/20/2019.
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economies because of their much lower piece rates and additional labour pay-
ments (Borino, 2018). Piece-rate compensation has been found to increase
productivity (Lazear, 2000; Guiteras & Jack, 2018). However, incentives that
increase work speed may lead to disregard for safety procedures by individual
workers if such measures appear to reduce the pace of work. Moreover, workers
under a piece-rate regime might consider health-promoting practices such as
work breaks costly when they have targets to meet thereby increasing the risk
of fatigue and injury. Studies in both developing and advanced economies have
found an increased risk of workplace injury for piece-rate workers (Davis, 2016;
Bender, Green, & Heywood, 2012).
4 Hypothesis and Estimation Method
The aim of this section is to evaluate empirically the relationship between
informal employment and occupational health in terms of the probability of
getting injured or falling ill due to work-related causes. On the basis of the
discussion in previous sections, the hypothesis is as follows:
H1: In Cambodia, informal employment increases the probability of sustaining
a work injury/illness.
To test this hypothesis, assume that work injury/illness is determined by a
latent variable,
Y ∗i = X iβ1 + In fiδ+ ui (1)
for person i, i = 1, . . . , N . Yi, which is observed, equals 1 if Y ∗i > 0, meaning
that person i suffered an injury; Yi equals 0 if Y
∗
i ≤ 0. In equation 1, X i is a
set of variables including individual, job and firm characteristics, In fi is the
main independent variable indicating whether the individual is an informal
employee. β1 andδ are the parameters for estimation and u is the error term that
captures the unobserved determinants of occupational injury. Assuming that u
has a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, the relationship
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between informal employment and occupational injury can be estimated using
the following probit model:
Prob(Yi = 1) = Φ(X
′
iβ + In fiδ) (2)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution. Equation 1.2 is a
standard approach in the empirical literature on differences in injury probability
by employment or contract type (e.g Hernanz and Toharia (2006) and Donado
(2015)). The expectation is for the estimate of δ to be negative.
However, as highlighted by Deadman and MacDonald (2004), the univariate
probit model above might yield a biased estimate of the effect of informal
employment on occupational injury if, as is likely the case, there is an overlap
in unobserved characteristics that determine both informal employment and
occupational injury. This potential for unobserved heterogeneity will manifest
in form of a correlation between the error term in equation 1 and the variables
that determine informal employment. In this situation, informal employment
will be endogenous and the estimate of β will be biased, showing not only
the effect of informal employment but also the effect on work injury/illness of
having this unobservable characteristic. These concerns can be addressed using
a bivariate probit model in which the probability of sustaining an occupational
injury/illness and the probability of being an informal employee are jointly
estimated. According to Fairlie (2005), this procedure is equivalent to an
instrumental variables or two-stage least squares model and is suitable when
the dependent variable and the endogenous explanatory variable are binary.
As in equation 1, assume that informal employment is determined by a
latent variable which is unobserved,





where only In fi is observed as either 0 or 1, Zi is a vector of identifying restric-
tions containing variables that are not included in (1.1) and "i is the error term.
The two error terms, ui in (1.1) and "i in (1.3), have a joint bivariate normal
distribution with zero mean, unit variance and correlation ρ. The bivariate
probit model is used when ρ 6= 0.
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The choice identifying restrictions is crucial. In this instance, the choice is
also constrained by the richness of the data set being used. Thus, the identifying
restriction included in Zi is the number of household members in informal
employment. This variable is strongly associated with the probability of informal
employment and highlights the importance of social capital in the labour market,
perhaps more so for informal employment opportunities. Because there are no
formal channels for recruitment into informal jobs, firms and workers depend
on word of mouth and referrals to connect with each other. Information on
informal job openings is mostly spread around through a social network of
family and friends (Arbex & O’Dea, 2011).
4.1 Control Variables
The control variables include individual, job and firm characteristics identified
in the literature as determinants of the probability of occupational injury such
as age, gender, education, industrial sector, region and union membership, firm
size and others. On age, some studies show that injury rates decrease with age
as older workers are more experienced and therefore more aware of job-specific
risks (Salminen, 2004). On the other hand, the physical effects of ageing such
as poor vision, hearing difficulties and reduced bodily coordination could make
older workers more prone to occupational accidents. Moreover, older workers
might be assigned to more dangerous tasks requiring more experience making
them more likely to sustain an injury (Bande & López-Mourelo, 2015). Age
will also capture the impact of cumulative exposure to job hazards as some
job-related health problems become evident with age (Fletcher et al., 2011).
Controlling for gender accounts for the difference in physical capacity be-
tween men and women. Employers may assign women to less dangerous duties
or women sort themselves into less dangerous jobs (Lavetti & Schmutte, 2018).
Moreover, women have been found to be less likely to engage in risky behaviour
such as excessive alcohol consumption or drug abuse which reduces the prob-
ability of occupational injury (Leeth & Ruser, 2006). On the other hand, the
possibility that workplace designs are better suited to men than women or that
women may be more likely to report an injury incident to the management can
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result in higher injury rates for women (Kelsh & Sahl, 1996).
The sector and occupation variables account for the fact that injury risk
differs across jobs (Mock et al., 2005). A builder, for example, faces a higher risk
of injury than a teacher. The industrial and occupation dummies also capture the
distribution of workers and working conditions in the labour market. I include
dummies for eight industrial and nine occupational categories. The region
dummy controls for particular features of labour markets across the country
such as the relative availability of formal wage employment and institutional
capacity for the enforcement of health and safety regulations.
The education variable brings the human capital perspective into the anal-
ysis in the sense that exposure to high-risk jobs is in part determined by the
individual’s level of schooling attainment. One possible channel for the human
capital effect is that more and better education increases access to relatively
safer white-collar jobs or to move up the ladder to safer supervisory roles within
the various occupational groups. Another channel is that more educated work-
ers are better equipped to navigate potentially risky situations on the job or may
have a more cautious approach to work (Oh & Shin, 2003; Piha, Laaksonen,
Martikainen, Rahkonen, & Lahelma, 2012). Thus, an association between
informal employment and occupational injury may reflect low educational at-
tainment among informal workers. Earnings are also included as an indicator
of job quality and socioeconomic status since labour standards are less likely
to be upheld in low-paid jobs. Low pay has been linked to job dissatisfaction
which increases the risk of work accidents (Gyekye & Salminen, 2006). The
size and the registration status of the firm in which the individual works is also
controlled for. Workers in larger firms may face a lower risk of injury since
larger firms have a greater incentive and financial capacity to actively promote
a safe working environment. Moreover, large and registered firms are more
likely to be inspected by regulatory authorities given their visibility (Poland,
2017).
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5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 2012 Cambodia Labour Force and Child Labour Survey
The combined Cambodia labour force (LFS) and child labour survey was con-
ducted by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of Cambodia with technical
assistance from the International Labour Organization in 2012. The LFS data is
used in the present study. The LFS obtained information in different dimensions
of people’s economic activity. It gathers national and regional statistics on
employment, unemployment and underemployment among other dimensions
of working life in Cambodia. The specific objectives of the survey as detailed
by NIS (2013) include, inter alia, to collect information on employment and
informal employment across occupational groups and industrial sectors and
education levels. Other specific objectives include the provision of data on
decent work in terms of earnings from employment, hours of work, quality of
employment, safety at work and a host of other issues.
The data was collected between February and April 2012 and is a nationally
representative survey based on a stratified sample covering 9,600 households
from 600 enumeration areas (EAs) located across all 23 provinces of the country
and the capital Phnom Penh. All types of households, including single-person
households, in both urban and rural areas were involved in the survey. Further
details about the sample design and survey implementation are provided in
NIS (2013). The complete data set as obtained from the NIS contains a total of
48,290 individuals including children. My analysis is however based on wage
employees with complete information on all the variables resulting in 8,577
observations.
The occupational health outcome for this study is based on survey question
J.1 in section J which collects information on occupational injuries within the
last 12 months. Question J.1 asks: ‘In the last 12 months, was (NAME) hurt in
any accident while working that caused him/her injury or illness?’, to which the
worker provides a yes or no answer. The employment section contains indicators
which enable the classification of employment as formal or informal. In this
study, all workers hired without a written contract are classified as informal. On
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the other hand, all workers hired on the basis of a written employment contract
and/or public sector employees are classified as formal workers. Following ILO
guidelines as presented in (Williams & Lansky, 2013), it is important to note
that informal employment includes all informal jobs regardless of whether such
jobs are conducted in formal enterprises, informal enterprises or households.
This considers the fact that formal firms do engage workers on an informal
basis so as to avoid social security contributions, severance payments and other
liabilities in the event of dismissal. Table A.1 in the appendix presents summary
statistics of selected variables.
5.2 General Sample Characteristics
The study focuses on working individuals in Cambodia who are 15 years old
and above. Informal and formal wage employment constitute 80.60% and
19.40% of total employment respectively. Table A2 in the appendix presents
some key characteristics workers in informal and formal employment and the
sample as a whole. There are more men than women in informal employment
(62.14% vs 37.86%). The reverse is the case in formal employment where
women predominate at 65.53%. Most workers are in the are in the 25-34
age group and have only primary education or less. The level of education
is considerably higher among formal employees with a total of 58.10% of
them having at least secondary education compared to 35.76% for informal
employees. The manufacturing sector has the highest wage employment share
(30.40%) followed by agriculture (29.28%) and construction (17.40 %). Most
formal wage employment (73.56%) is in the manufacturing sector. While
the majority of informal employees work in micro and small firms (a total
of 84.37%), most formal employment is in medium-sized firms as defined in
Cambodia.9 Table A3 in the appendix presents these general characteristics
according to employment type and gender. It shows that the level of education
is slightly lower among women, 62.74% of whom have completed only primary
education or below as against 57.77% for men. Also slightly more men than
9In Cambodia, micro firms are those with fewer than 10 employees, small firms have 11-50
employees, medium firms have 51-100 employees and large firms are those with over 100
employees (Baily, 2008, p. 6).
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women have received post-primary education. Almost the same percentage
of women and men (29.52% vs 28.98%) are employed in agriculture. The
percentage of women working in manufacturing is almost triple that of men
(47.91% vs 17.07%), reflecting the high concentration of women in garment
factories which is the mainstay of the manufacturing sector in Cambodia. The
reverse is the case in construction which employs 27.15% of men and just 4.61%
of women.
5.3 Prevalence of Non-fatal Occupational Injury or Illness
8.55% of individuals in the sample had suffered an occupational injury/illness
in the last 12 months. The prevalence rate was however higher in informal
employment compared to formal employment- 9.14% vs 6.07%. Table A4 in the
appendix shows the prevalence rates in the informal and formal employment
across socio-demographic characteristics. The prevalence of injury/ illness
was almost two times higher among men (10.56%) than women (5.90%) in
the total sample and in informal employment (11.01% vs 6.07%) but the
difference was smaller for men and women in formal employment (7.17% vs
5.50). The 35-44 age group had the highest prevalence of injury while persons
with primary education or less had the highest prevalence in the total sample
and among informal workers. Individuals with a job tenure of 10 years or more
had a higher prevalance of injury/illness than those with a job tenure of less
than three months (10.83% vs 5.83%). This pattern holds in the full sample
and the two employment types. At the occupational level in the full sample,
‘craft and related trades’ had the highest prevalance of 12.75% followed by
10.07% among workers in ‘elementary trades’ while ‘professionals’ had the
lowest prevalance at 4.70%. At the sectoral level, mining had the highest
prevalence (12.82%) followed by construction (11.60%) and transportation
(10.84%). This pattern of injury/illness prevalence at the sectoral level also
holds among informal employees. Among informal employees and the sample
as a whole, the prevalence of injury/illness (4.71% and 4.75% respectively) is
lowest among those in medium-sized enterprises and much higher in smaller
firms.
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6 Discussion of Results
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix present the results of the bivariate and
univariate probit estimates of the relationship between informal employment
and the probability of suffering a work injury/illness. As the test for the null
hypothesis (at the bottom of Table A1) that ρ = 0 (i.e that the error terms of
equations (1) and (3) are correlated) cannot be rejected, the univariate probit
model will yield consistent estimates which I discuss in what follows. Table 1
below presents the main results from the estimation of different specifications
of equation 1.
Table 1: Effect of informal employment on the probability of suffering a work injury or
illness, Cambodia 2012 (probit estimates based on CLFS data)
Marginal effect t-statistic
Without any controls 0.0338 4.08
Controls for personal characteristics 0.0429 4.90
Controls for job characteristics 0.0034 0.32
Controls for firm characteristics −0.0101 −0.94
Controls for personal, job and firm characteristics 0.0015 0.13
Without any controls, informal employment significantly increases the proba-
bility of occupational injury/illness, as hypothesis H1 posits, by 3.38 percentage
points. Controlling only for personal characteristics in the second specification
increases the probability of injury/illness by 4.29 percentage points which, as in
the initial case of informal employment with no control variables, is significant
at the 1% level. Controlling only for job characteristics in the third specification
and only for firm characteristics in the fourth specification, the marginal effect
of informal employment is lower in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
This is also the case in the fifth and most complete specification of the probit
model with all control variables included. Here, informal employment increases
the probability of suffering a work injury/illness by 0.15 percentage points
but this effect is insignificant. The results in table 1 therefore show that the
positive association between informal employment and occupational health is
not robust to the inclusion of a range of personal, job and firm characteristics.
Once these factors are considered, informal employees are not at a higher risk
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of sustaining a work injury at least in the context of Cambodia. That is, the
fact that a worker is not employed on a formal contract does not appear on
its own to expose them to a higher risk of work injury/illness. The higher
health risk for informal employees relative to formal employees obtained in
the initial specification may be linked largely to the kind of jobs they do in
terms of the level of accident risk involved. Summary statistics from Table A1
in the appendix for example indicate that informal employment is highest in
‘elementary occupations’ and ‘craft and related trades’ both of which tend to be
manual occupations with tend to have a higher risk of accidents. The initially
higher health risk for informal employees may also be explained by the kind
of firms they work in. Firms differ in the efficiency with which they ‘produce’
workplace safety through the acquisition of safety technology (Wei et al., 2005).
In the full result of the estimation with all control variables included (column
5 of table A5 in the appendix), firm size is in fact one of the few significant
determinants of occupational health. Workers in smaller size categories are
significantly more likely to have a work injury/illness compared with those in
the reference category of 50 or more employees.
The finding that informal employees (and other workers thought to be
disadvantaged such as those on fixed-term contracts) are not significantly more
likely to have an accident or work-related illness is not uncommon in empirical
studies (e.g Alfers and Rogan (2015); Cioni and Savioli (2016); Hernanz and
Toharia (2006)). So, in the context of a developing country like Cambodia, what
could possibly explain this finding? One plausible explanation is that due to
limited state administrative capacity, workplace safety is as much a problem in
the formal sector as it is in the informal sector. There are laws such as Prakas10
124 on indoor air quality in factories but as Down (2016) notes, enforcement
is weak or non-existent. According to the Ministry of Labour and Vocational
Training in Cambodia, in 201111, there were 91 occupational safety and health
inspectors responsible for nationwide inspection visits (MLVT, 2011, p. 11). This
10Prakas are issued by the Ministry for Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training and
Youth Rehabilitation in relation to the Labour Law. For more on these, see http://
www.arbitrationcouncil.org/en/resources/labour-law-and-regulations/
prakas Accessed 03/10/2019.
11The year before the survey used in the empirical analysis of this paper was conducted.
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number of labour inspectors is inadequate for the size of Cambodia’s working
population which is about 10.75 million (NIS, 2013, p. 30).12 These figures
point to a very low probability of inspection: The average formal employee in a
registered establishment in Cambodia is unlikely to see a labour inspector all
through his or her working life. As the results in table A5 show, the effect of
working in a registered firm on the probability of injury is negative, as expected,
but insignificant. Apart from issues of corruption and lack of transparency in
the labour inspectorate system (Human Rights Watch, 2015), it has also been
argued that the unwillingness to enforce labour laws (and the repression of
labour more broadly) is a part of the political and economic strategy of the
political elite (Berliner, Greenleaf, Lake, & Noveck, 2015; Salmivaara, 2018).
Another explanation for the insignificance of informal employment is based
on models of worker learning and adaptive behaviour (Viscusi, 1979; Viscusi
& O’Connor, 1984). When workers begin a job, they are imperfectly informed
about the occupational hazards they are getting into. However, through personal
or colleagues’ experiences of occupational injuries/illnesses, they update their
initial expectations about the job and decide to quit if the experiences are
sufficiently unpleasant to warrant an exit from the job. However, as a worker is
becoming more aware about the job hazards, the cost of quitting the job is also
increasing Robinson (1987). This is particularly the case in formal employment
where the worker stands to lose not just relatively higher pay, but pensions,
health insurance and other benefits. Thus, a formal employee might decide
to stay on even after discovering the hazards of a job because of the difficulty
in finding alternative formal employment. Informal work on the other hand,
with its low barriers to entry, arguably offers more scope for the process of job
experimentation that Viscusi and O’Connor (1984) analyse. It is relatively easy
for an informal worker to disengage from a job that he or she has discovered to
be dangerous and find something else that suits his or her tolerance for risk.
Hence, the high turnover rate in informal employment may shield informal
workers from occupational risk.13
12According to ILO’s benchmark of one labour inspector for every 40,000 workers in less
developed countries, there should be 269 labour inspectors in Cambodia.
13This statement is speculative. I am not aware of any studies that consider this matter.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I attempt to examine empirically the relationship between informal
employment and work injury/illness in Cambodia. Results from probit models
show that informal employment on its own is significantly associated with a 3.38
percentage point increase in the probability of suffering a work injury/illness.
Controlling only for personal characteristics, informal employment significantly
increases the probability of illness/injury by 4.29 percentage points while
controlling only for job or firm characteristics, the effect of informal employment
is insignificant. In the most complete specification of the probit model with
controls for personal, job and firm characteristics all included, the effect of
informal employment turns out to be small in magnitude and insignificant,
contrary to the hypothesis set out in the paper. I discuss possible explanations
for this economically interesting, if statistically insignificant, result.
The empirical analysis however has some shortcomings. For instance, due
to limitations in the data set, only one identifying restriction has been included
in the bivariate probit model (table A4 in the appendix) that jointly estimates
the probability of sustaining an injury/illness and the probability of being in
informally employed. I am unable to test alternative identifying restrictions.
Hence the extent and direction of bias in the effect of informal employment may
not have been robustly determined. Richer data including panel data (showing
how workers transit between employment types over time and how this affects
their health) would greatly improve the economic analysis of occupational
health and safety in developing countries.
The results here nevertheless raise the question of whether occupational
health regulation in Cambodia should rely on labour inspections which focus
on the formal sector or whether is should be regarded as a public health issue
that is not concerned with the form of the employment relationship or enter-
prise. Either case will require strengthening the institutional capacity for the
enforcement of health and safety regulations in workplaces across Cambodia.
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Appendix
Table A1: Characteristics of workers in informal and formal employment1
Informal Formal Total
Sex
Female 37.86 65.53 43.24
Male 62.14 34.38 56.76
Age
15-24 46.70 58.71 49.03
25-34 26.37 29.80 27.03
35-44 14.97 8.05 13.63
45-54 9.09 2.82 7.88
55+ 2.85 0.60 2.41
Education
Primary or below 64.24 41.95 59.91
Secondary 33.62 49.39 36.67
Tertiary 2.14 8.71 3.41
Occupation
Managers 0.17 1.86 0.50
Professionals 1.27 3.67 1.73
Technicians & associate professionals 2.88 4.20 3.14
Clerical support workers 0.91 4.17 1.54
Service & sales workers 7.75 6.55 7.52
Skilled agriculture & forestry workers 1.46 0.18 1.21
Craft & related trades 16.37 6.91 14.54
Plant & machinery operatives 15.26 64.48 24.81
Elementary occupations 53.91 7.99 45.00
Sector
Agriculture 35.70 2.28 29.28
Mining 1.03 0.42 0.90
Manufacturing 20.02 73.56 30.40
Electricity 0.36 0.84 0.45
Construction 21.03 2.34 17.40
Trade 4.15 3.19 3.96
Transportation 6.97 3.19 6.23
Other services 10.73 14.18 11.40
Firm size
Works alone 8.49 5.35 7.88
2-4 22.10 5.70 18.92
5-9 22.45 5.29 19.12
10-19 20.09 5.47 17.26
20-49 11.23 5.35 10.08
50+ 15.64 72.83 26.73
N 6913 1664 8577
1 Data source: CLFS 2012. Figures in the table are percentages.
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Table A2: Characteristics of study sample by employment type and gender1
Female Male
Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total
Age
15-24 49.94 65.02 54.38 44.47 46.68 44.97
25-34 24.22 26.65 24.94 29.68 35.84 28.64
35-44 13.87 6.41 11.67 15.64 11.20 15.11
45-54 8.98 1.74 6.85 9.17 4.90 8.67
55+ 2.98 0.18 2.16 2.80 1.40 2.60
Education
Primary or below 68.40 49.18 62.74 61.70 28.14 57.77
Secondary 29.57 45.88 34.38 36.08 55.94 38.41
Tertiary 2.02 4.95 2.88 2.21 15.91 3.82
Occupation
Managers 0.11 0.64 0.27 0.20 4.20 0.68
Professionals 1.40 2.50 1.70 1.21 5.94 1.80
Technicians & associate
professionals
3.02 3.50 3.15 2.80 5.60 3.12
Clerical support workers 1.12 4.03 2.00 0.77 4.37 1.20
Service & sales workers 11.40 2.84 8.90 5.54 13.64 6.50
Skilled agriculture &
forestry workers
1.64 0.18 1.21 1.35 0.17 1.21
Craft & related trades 8.06 3.94 6.85 21.44 12.60 20.40
Plant & machinery opera-
tives
21.93 76.65 38.04 11.20 41.25 14.72
Elementary occupations 51.32 5.77 37.90 21.93 12.24 50.41
Sector
Agriculture 41.40 1.00 29.52 32.24 4.54 28.98
Mining 0.30 0.18 0.27 1.47 0.87 1.40
Manufacturing 31.68 86.81 47.91 12.92 48.25 1.90
Electricity 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.51 2.27 0.71
Construction 6.34 0.46 4.61 29.98 5.94 27.15
Trade 4.66 1.83 3.83 3.84 5.76 4.06
Transportation 1.66 0.05 1.30 10.24 8.21 10.00
Other services 13.90 8.97 12.46 8.80 24.12 10.60
Firm size
Works alone 8.67 5.49 7.74 8.38 5.07 8.00
2-4 18.80 2.84 14.10 24.12 11.18 22.60
5-9 19.18 1.92 14.10 24.44 11.71 22.95
10-19 18.07 2.36 13.50 21.32 11.01 20.11
20-49 9.63 3.66 7.87 12.20 8.57 11.77
50+ 25.64 83.51 42.67 9.54 52.44 14.58
N 2617 1092 3709 4296 572 4868
1 Data source: CLFS 2012. Figures in the table are percentages.
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Table A3: Non-fatal occupational injury/illness in informal and formal employment1
Informal Formal Total
Gender
Female 6.07 5.50 5.90
Male 11.01 7.17 10.56
Age
15-24 6.38 5.01 6.06
25-34 10.31 6.25 9.44
35-44 14.40 11.94 14.11
45-54 10.50 8.51 10.35
55-64 11.68 10.00 11.60
Education
Primary or below 9.28 5.73 8.80
Secondary 9.17 6.33 8.43
Tertiary 4.73 6.20 5.46
Occupation
Managers n/a 9.68 6.98
Professionals 4.54 4.92 4.70
Technicians & associate professionals 10.05 2.86 8.18
Clerical support workers 1.60 8.70 5.30
Service & sales workers 3.00 11.00 4.34
Skilled agriculture & forestry workers 4.95 33.33 5.77
Craft & related trades 15.51 5.21 12.75
Plant & machinery operatives 4.83 5.68 5.27
Elementary occupations 10.25 5.26 10.07
Sector
Agriculture 9.89 7.90 9.86
Mining 14.08 n/a 12.82
Manufacturing 6.80 5.23 6.05
Electricity 4.00 7.14 5.13
Construction 11.49 15.38 11.59
Trade 8.01 11.32 8.53
Transportation 11.61 3.77 10.84
Other services 4.99 8.05 5.73
Firm size
Works alone 11.58 4.49 10.65
2-4 9.62 9.47 9.61
5-9 9.47 14.77 9.75
10-19 8.20 6.00 8.10
20-49 13.53 12.35 13.41
50+ 4.71 4.78 4.75
N 6913 1664 8577
1 Data source: CLFS 2012. Figures in the table are percentages.
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Household size −0.0167 0.00840
(−1.54) (0.67)











Age squared −0.000142 0.000304
(−0.90) (1.51)
Tenure (ref: 10 years or more)
< 3 months −0.288∗∗ 0.136
(−2.84) (1.13)
3 months to < 6 months −0.0313 0.123
(−0.30) (1.01)
6 months to < 12 months −0.0966 0.249∗
(−0.90) (2.10)
1 year to < 3 years 0.00535 0.146
(0.06) (1.37)
3 years to < 5 years 0.0115 0.102
(0.11) (0.89)
5 years to < 10 years 0.0184 −0.0102
(0.17) (−0.08)





Technicians and associate professionals 0.0427 0.265∗
(0.28) (2.26)
Clerical support workers 0.0593 −0.0124∗
(0.27) (−0.08)
Service and sales workers −0.243 −0.0252
(−1.63) (−0.21)
Skilled agric., forestry and fishery workers −0.218 0.194
(−0.93) (0.57)
Craft and related trades 0.245 0.416∗∗∗
(2.47) (4.91)
Elementary occupations 0.107 0.367∗∗∗
(1.11) (4.12)








Employer registered −0.0336 −0.827∗∗∗
(−0.31) (−13.47)
Firm size (ref: 50 or more persons)
Works alone 0.143 0.192
(1.33) (2.00)
2-4 persons 0.214∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(2.06) (6.66)
5-9 persons 0.221∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(2.14) (5.71)
10-19 persons 0.118 0.515∗∗∗
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(1.79) (5.46)













Transportation and storage −0.0661 −0.374∗∗
(−0.70) (−2.69)







t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The estimations include 25 provincial dummies which are not reported in order to save space
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Table A5: Probability of sustaining an occupational injury or illness. Probit estimates
(marginal effects). Dependent variable: Injury
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Informal 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.00338 −0.0101 0.00147
(4.08) (4.90) (0.32) (−0.94) (0.13)
Female −0.0352∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗
(−5.52) (−3.33)
Household size −0.00250 −0.00220
(−1.69) (−1.50)











Age squared −0.0000211 −0.0000179
(−0.99) (−0.84)
Tenure (ref:10 years or more)
< 3 months −0.0303∗ −0.0348∗
(−2.23) (−2.56)
3 months to < 6 months 0.000662 −0.00372
(0.04) (−0.25)
6 months to < 12 months −0.00770 −0.0120
(−0.51) (−0.80)
1 year to < 3 years 0.000720 0.00152
(0.05) (0.11)
3 years to < 5 years −0.000161 0.00227
(−0.01) (0.15)
5 years to < 10 years 0.00425 0.00270
(0.26) (0.16)





Technicians and associate professionals 0.0278 0.00847
(1.63) (0.44)
Clerical support workers −0.00106 0.00602
(−0.06) (0.21)
Service and sales workers −0.00927 −0.0248
(−0.98) (−1.70)
Skilled agric, forestry and fishery workers 0.00871 −0.0209
(0.36) (−0.93)
Craft and related trades 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗
(6.75) (3.13)
Elementary occupations 0.0530∗∗∗ 0.0179
(6.22) (1.54)










Firm size (ref: 50+)
Works alone 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0201
(4.19) (1.65)
2-4 persons 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗
(4.46) (2.87)
5-9 persons 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗
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(4.36) (2.94)
10-19 persons 0.0278∗∗ 0.0275∗
(2.77) (2.46)













Transportation and storage 0.00689 −0.0104
(0.50) (−0.78)
Other services −0.0376∗∗∗ −0.0175
(−4.08) (−1.11)
N 8577 8577 8577 8577 8577
Specifications (2) and (5) include 25 provincial dummies which are not reported to save space
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A6: Description and summary statistics of variables1
Variable Description Mean SD
Informal 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual
is informally employed
0.806 0.395
Injury 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual
sustained a non-fatal work
injury/illness in the last 12
months
0.085 0.280
Female 1/0 dummy: 1 if female 0.432 0.495
Household size Number of people in house-
hold
5.820 2.058
Change job 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual
wishes to change current job
0.080 0.272
Married 1/0 dummy: 1 if Married 0.420 0.494
Education Level of education attained
by the individual: 1) Primary
or below; 2)Secondary; 3)
Tertiary
1.435 0.560
Age Age in years 28.096 10.762
Tenure Years worked for current
employer: 1) Less than 3
months; 2) 3 months to less
than 6 months; 3) 6 months
to less than 12 months; 4) 1
year to less than 3 years; 5) 3
years to less than 5 years; 6)
5 years to less than 10 years;
7) 10 years or more
3.47 1.724
Province Province of residence- 25
provincial dummy
10.371 6.870
Occupation Occupation of main job: 1)
Managers; 2) Professionals;
3) Technicians and associate
professionals; 4) Clerical sup-
port workers; 5) Service and
sales workers; 6) Skilled agri-
culture, forestry and fishery
workers; 7) Craft and related
trades workers; 8) Plant and
machinery operatives; 9) El-
ementary occupations
7.700 1.770
Hours worked Number of hours usually
worked per week
51.910 12.617
Union 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual
is a member of a union
0.107 0.310
Earnings Log of last pay 11.708 1.455
Table A6 – Continued on next page
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Table A6 – continued
Variable Description Mean SD
Registered 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual
works in a registered firm
3.830 1.673
Firm size Number of employees in firm:
1) Works alone; 2) 2-4; 3) 5-
9; 4) 10-19; 5) 20-49; 6) 50
or more
3.830 1.673
Industry Industry of main job: 1) Agri-
culture; 2) Mining; 3) Man-
ufacturing; 4) Electricity, gas
and water supply; 5) Con-
struction; 6) Transportation
and storage; 9) Other ser-
vices
3.700 2.370
HHinformal Number of household mem-
bers engaged in informal em-
ployment
2.723 1.664
1 Data source: CLFS 2012
2 All variables have 8557 observations
3 25 provincial dummies in Cambodia not included to save space
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